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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It is not discernible when the court will or will not apply the defec-
tive statement-defective cause rules. It is apparent, however, that an
alert attorney should amend as early as possible after the sustaining of
a demurrer and not rely on relation back.1 4 Similarly, should he dis-
cover a defect in his complaint, he would be wise to amend and not to
rely on waiver.
H. MoRIusoN JOHNSTON, JR.
Food-Sales-Implied Warranty of Fitness for Human
Consumption.
In Adams v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co.' plaintiff purchaser of a
box of corn flakes sued defendant retailer for damages for breach of an
implied warranty. While eating the corn flakes plaintiff bit down on an
extremely hard object and broke off part of a tooth, the remainder of
which was subsequently extracted. Plaintiff alleged that the food, sold
in the original sealed container, was unwholesome and unfit for human
consumption. 2 A chemical analysis showed that the object causing the
harm was part of a grain of corn that had partially crystalized into a
state as hard as quartz. In affirming an involuntary nonsuit, the North
Carolina court held as a matter of law that the presence of the harmful
object was not a breach of the implied warranty. The court predicated
"' In the principal case the death occurred February 26, 1956; the defendant's
demurrer ore tenus was sustained January 31, 1958; and the plaintiff's attorney did
not ask leave to amend until March 7, 1958. If he had immediately moved for
leave to amend instead of relying upon relation back, he could have averted the
situation which defeated the cause of action for wrongful death.
1251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E.2d 92 (1960).
Where the article is sold for human consumption, the existence of the implied
warranty between vendee and his immediate vendor is firmly established in North
Carolina. Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E2d 822 (1951); Williams v.
Elson, 218 N.C. 157, 10 S.E.2d 668 (1940); Rabb v. Covington, 215 N.C. 572, 2
S.E.2d 705 (1939). See generally Note, 32 N.C.L. REv. 351 (1954).
It is not clear in North Carolina whether the vendee could sue the manufacturer
on implied warranty. An initial dictum stated that the manufacturer could be held
liable. Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 171 N.C. 33, 87 S.E. 958 (1916).
In Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935) the court
expressly rejected this theory for the reason that there was no contractual relation
between the manufacturer and the consumer to which implied warranty could
attach. This requirement of privity was followed in subsequent cases. Enloe v.
Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180 S.E. 582 (1935) ; Caudlc v.
F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105, 16 S.E.2d 680 (1941). The present
trend in other jurisdictions is toward eliminating this requirement of privity. See
generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960);
Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery on Warranty, 19 N.C.L.
REv. 551 (1941).
Plaintiff may sue the manufacturer for negligence. Ward v. Morehead City
Seafood Co., supra. The value of the warranty action is that negligence need not
be proved, implied warranty being a form of liability without fault. Existence of
the warranty does not eliminate the necessity for proof that the product was de-
fective when it left the manufacturer's hands. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Adams, 213 Md. 521, 132 A.2d 484 (1957). See generally DicxansoN, PRODUcTS
LIABILITY AND THE FooD CoNsuER §§ 2.15, 4.1 (1951) ; PRossER, TORTS § 84 (2d
ed. 1955).
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the decision on its finding that the harmful object was natural to the corn
flakes and that a consumer of the product should be expected to antici-
pate its presence.
This appears to be the first North Carolina decision on whether or
not the presence in food of a harmful substance natural to the product is
a breach of the implied warranty of fitness for human consumption.3 In
similar cases other jurisdictions have differed as to both the test for
liability and the result obtained. As background for an analysis of
Adams some of those decisions from other states will be examined.4
In Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co.5 plaintiff, while eating a chicken pie
in defendant's restaurant, was injured by a fragment of chicken bone.
On appeal defendant's demurrer was sustained, the court stating: "It
is sufficient if it may be said that as a matter of common knowledge
chicken pies occasionally contain chicken bones.... Bones which are
natural to the type of meat served cannot legitimately be called a foreign
substance, and a consumer who eats meat dishes ought to anticipate and
be on his guard against the presence of such bones."6 The rationale of
Mix appears to be that food suppliers are not held to a standard of per-
fection and that consumers ought to anticipate the occasional presence
of substances which are natural constituents of the food even though
such substances are normally removed during preparation for consump-
tion. This reasoning has been followed in a number of cases 7 where the
factual circumstances have been analogous to Mix.
"'The case is apparently one of first impression in North Carolina." Brief for
Appellee, p. 2. Compare Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E2d 392
(1955), 34 N.C.L. Rxv. 394 (1956) (sale of hair rinse); Droughon v. Maddox,
237 N.C. 742, 75 S.E2d 917 (1953), 32 N.C.L. REv. 351 (1954) (sale of cow at
public auction); Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951), 30 N.C.L.
REv. 191 (1952) (alleged poisonous ingredients in salt substitute); Walker v.
Hickory Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158, 16 S.E.2d 668 (1941) (spoiled and rancid
lard); Williams v. Elson, 218 N.C. 157, 10 S.E2d 668 (1940) (glass in sandwich) ;
Rabb v. Covington, 215 N.C. 572, 2 S.E2d 705 (1939) (metal in encased sausages).
'Both warranty and negligence cases are utilized in this discussion. The pur-
pose of this note is to determine on what basis courts find food to be "unfit for
human consumption" due to the presence of some "natural object." A finding of
unfitness is essential to either action. On the similarities of the two actions, see
Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959); Hertzler v.
Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924). See generally DicKERsoN,
PRoDucTs LIABILITY AND THE FooD CoNsuMER § 1.11 (1951); 2 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS §28.22 (1956); PaossER, TORTS §84 (2d ed. 1955); 5 WiLLiSTON, Cox-
TRAcrs § 1505 (1937) ; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Y,..E L.J. 1099(1960).
6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (1936).
OId. at 681, 59 P.2d at 148.
1E.g., Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (fish
bone in "Hot Barquette of Seafood Mornay") ; Lamb v. Hill, 112 Cal. App. 2d.
41, 245 P.2d 316 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (splinter of bone in chicken pie) ; Norris
v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 369, 53 S.E.2d 718 (1949)
(bone in barbecued pork sandwich) ; Goodwin v. Country Club, 323 Ill. App. 1, 54
N.E.2d 612 (1944) (turkey bone in creamed chicken) ; Brown v. Nebiker, 229 Iowa
1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941) (bone fragment in pork chop). In Silva v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 649, 83 P2d 76 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938) (turkey
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Other cases, however, have placed less reliance on the naturalness
of the object as a test in. itself, but instead have determined liability by
looking at the nature of the final product, the circumstances normally
surrounding its consumption and the customary habits and common
knowledge of mankind.8 The test applied in these cases is what the
average consumer could reasonably expect to find in his food. Thus in
Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp.9 the court reversed a dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint which was based on the presence of a sliver of chicken bone
in a chicken sandwich. Discussing Mix at length, the opinion stated:
Naturalness of the substance to any ingredients in the food
served is important only in determining whether the consumer
may reasonably expect to find such substance in the particular
type of dish or style of food served.... The test should be what
is reasonably expected by the consumer in the food as served, not
what might be natural to the ingredients of that food prior to
preparation. 10
Adams appears to follow the rationale of Mix." Assuming that the
substance was natural to the corn flakes, the holding is consistent with
other cases following MiX.' 2 The validity of the court's assumption" of
bone in roast turkey and dressing), the court cited Mix as controlling. The
opinion stated that the criterion for determining liability was whether the object
causing the injury was foreign;. this apparently disregards part of the Mix ra-
tionale, but under the facts the result follows Mix.8 E.g., Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 1959) (chicken
bone in chow mein prepared from "ready to serve boned chicken'); Lore v. De
Simone Bros., 172 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (fragment of bone in salami) ;
Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960) (oyster shell in fried
oysters); Wood v. Waldorf Sys., Inc., 79 R.I. 1, 83 A.2d 90 (1951) (fragment
of bone in chicken soup) ; Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d
64 (1960) (sliver of bone in chicken sandwich). In Wieland v. C. A. Swanson
& Sons, 223 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862 (1955), the court held
that whole chicken bones are anticipated in packaged chicken cut up for fricassee,
and that therefore they could not be the basis for liability; the court indicated that
bone slivers in the same product would sustain an action. While Lore, supra, and
Wood, supra, discuss the issue in terms of the naturalness of the object, they
clearly have departed from the Mix rationale, as they hold that fragments of bone
natural to meat are not natural to the final products involved.
'10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960).
" Id. at -, 103 N.W.2d at 67, 69. Compare Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St.
249, 258-59, 164 N.E2d 167, 174 (1960) : "However, the fact, that something that
is served with food and that will cause harm if eaten is natural to that food and
is not a 'foreign substance' will usually be an important factor in determining
whether a consumer can reasonably anticipate and guard against it."
"1 The opinion cites with apparent approval the Mix case and most of the cases
which have followed Mix.
1 These cases have uniformly decided the issue of liability as a matter of law.
E.g., Shapiro v. Hotel Statler Corp., 132 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (fish bone
in seafood); Norris v. Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shop, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 369, 53
S.E.2d 718 (1949) (bone in barbecued pork sandwich) ; Goodwin v. Country Club,
323 I1. App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944) (turkey bone in creamed chicken) ; Brown
v. Nebiker, 229 Iowa 1223, 296 N.W. 366 (1941) (bone fragment in pork chop).
Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960), expressly rejected the
Mix doctrine but looking at all the circumstances decided as a matter of law that a
piece of oyster shell in fried oysters is to be anticipated.
1" The opinion at the outset stated that "Plaintiff's case is based upon the pres-
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naturalness is, however, open to question. It is arguable that the "meta-
morphosis" undergone by the grain of corn in the process of its prepa-
ration changed its character in such a way that it was no longer natural
to either corn or corn flakes. This crystalized grain is distinguishable
from bones, oyster shells, cherry pits and other substances which,
although not removed from food, retain their original composition and
characteristics. In Adams there was certainly a basic change in the
corn. The finely processed nature of the final product in Adams, the
changed character of the particle of corn, and the manufacturer's claims
as to the fitness of his product as a breakfast food for children cast doubt
upon the soundness of the court's finding as a matter of law that the
object was "natural" to the corn flakes.14
In Giinenez v. Great AtL. & Pac. Tea Co., 5 a case analagous to
Adams, the plaintiff's stomach was lacerated as a result of eating canned
crab meat which contained stone-like, jagged, struvite crystals. These
crystals had formed subsequent to canning by a union of the chemicals
found in the natural juices of the meat. On appeal plaintiff's recovery
for breach of implied warranty was sustained, the New York court
finding that the crystals were "dangerous" and "deleterious." Neither
the appellate division nor the court of appeals stated whether the crystals
were natural or foreign.' 6 The variance in result from that in Adams
would seem to lie in the difference in rationale since the New York
court did not look to the test of naturalness.' As contrasted with the
preparation of meat, seafood, poultry, and fruit dishes, Adams and
Gimenez18 are instances where it is contemplated that the entire ingre-
dient will be made suitable for human consumption by a system of proc-
essing. Whenever the processing creates changes in the condition of the
ingredient so as to make the food in fact harmful, naturalness would
seem to have little bearing on fitness for human consumption.
If North Carolina had followed the reasoning of some of the more
recent cases, the result obtained in Adams might have been reached
ence in the corn flakes . . . of a substance natural to the corn flakes, and not
removed thereform in the process of its preparation for human consumption..
His is not a case of a foreign object . . . " 251 N.C. at 566-67, 112 S.E.2d at 94.
", Would the manufacturer, if joined, have contended that the object was natu-
ral to the product and was to be anticipated and guarded against by the average
consumer?
240 App. Div. 238, 269 N.Y.S. 463, aff'd, 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934).
Plaintiffs complaint was framed on the theory that the product contained a
deleterious substance other than crab meat.
" It is not clear what specific legal principles the court applied to determine lia-
bility but it is doubtful that the decision resttd on the consumer-expectation ap-
proach.
"8 Bones were not involved in the Gitenez case. The entire crab meat, as
canned, was expected to be eaten.
1960]
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without the questionable finding on the naturalness of the object. 19 The
court in its estimation of common knowledge might have held as a mat-
ter of law that one who eats corn flakes should anticipate the presence
of an occasional hard object derived from corn.20 However, it is equally
conceivable that the court would have left the question of reasonable fit-
ness to the jury.2 1
The present trend is toward using naturalness as only one factor
among others in order to determine what the consumer should expect.
Other jurisdictions have rejected the limitations of the Mix rule with
or without factual distinctions from the Mix case. Adams is factually
more distinguishable from Mix than the other holdings which follow its
rationale. It is submitted that reliance upon the consumer-expectation
rationale would provide a sounder basis for determining liability in fu-
ture cases arising in this area.
JorHN H. P. HELMS
Res Judicata-Consent Judgment in Favor of Infant as Bar to
Litigation Between Joint Tortfeasors.
In Pack v. McCoy' the plaintiff brought suit to recover for his per-
sonal injuries and property damage arising out of a motorcycle-bus col-
lision. Plaintiff was the operator of the motorcycle and defendants were
the bus driver and the bus company. In a previous personal injury
action a bus passenger, an infant, had sued the bus company, the bus
driver, and the motorcycle operator as joint tort-feasors. The infant's
suit was settled by a consent judgment entered in her favor against all
defendants. The defendants in Pack pleaded res judicata, asserting
that the prior judgment was a final adjudication of the issue of negli-
gence between the present parties. The supreme court reversed the trial
court's order striking the defense.2
" Naturalness would be relevant in some cases, but in others this test properly
could be omitted and the decision placed on what the consumer should expect, with
other criteria determining the issue.
2' See Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E.2d 167 (1960), where the
court took the case from the jury on the ground that common knowledge requires
that consumers of fried oysters anticipate the presence therein of an occasional
piece of oyster shell.
2' In most of the recent cases which have used "naturalness" only in conjunc-
tion with other criteria, the question of reasonable fitness has been left to the jury.
E.g., Bryer v. Rath Packing Co., 221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959); Lore v.
De Simone Bros., 172 N.Y.S2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Wood v. Waldorf Sys.,
Inc., 79 R.I. 1, 83 A2d 90 (1951); Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323,
.103 N.W.2d 64 (1960). Contra, Allen v. Grafton, 170 Ohio St. 249, 164 N.E2d
167 (1960).
1251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E2d 118 (1959).
-There was a dissent. Judge Bobbitt (Judge Parker joining) thought there
had not been an adjudication of the negligence between the former defendants, that
the defense should not be allowed, and that precedents to the contrary should be
over-ruled. 251 N.C. at 593, 112 S.E.2d at 121.
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